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Introduction
1.1.. Research objectives 
    This paper aims to present the findings of a comprehensive study of the 
transformation ofACLEDA Bank from an NGO to a commercial bank in Cambodia 
during 1993-2008. It seeks to explore lessons from BancoSol in Bolivia and Latin 
America for development of ACLEDAs transformation plan. Successful transformation f 
ACLEDA may then contribute good experience for micro-credit NGOs in Cambodia. 
The drivers of change model will be used in supporting the evidence from ACLEDA. 
     NGO-led micro-credit nstitutions play important roles in the poverty reduction 
program of the governments in developing countries (Chavan & Ramakumar, 2002). 
Several profit organizations in Cambodia have been transformed from the non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) after seeing opportunity of being the first mover and 
the needs for change and their clients, particularly after monitoring the external and 
internal factors, However, some remain unchanged. One of those that transformed to
profit gaining banking institutions includes ACLEDA bank plc. By the time ACLEDA 
began plans for transformation in 1997, there were seven NGO transformations i  Latin 
America (Fernando, 2004). It is not easy to say that the Bolivian model of NGO 
transformation was the sole inspiration for ACLEDA's own. It is easy to say that 
ACLEDA learned from BancoSol's experience. In 1998, ACLEDA senior management 
traveled to Bolivia to interview BancoSol and Prodem about the transformation that had 
taken place six years earlier. What they learned in the Andes had a powerful influence on 
the choices that ACLEDA would make for its own transformation along the Mekong 
region (Clark, 2006). Precedent was important. Without the first experience in Bolivia
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and subsequent i itiatives in Latin America nd others, it is unlikely that ACLEDAs plan 
would have successful to convince the host of people who would ultimately make a 
difference, such as the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC), investors, and ACLEDA staff 
members themselves. 
    The problem relates to why ACLEDA bank transformed and what benefits and 
lessons of this transformation were. Choices about he extent of the division between the 
two organizations (non-profit organization and commercial bank) shape how each will 
function in the future. Will the NGO transfer its entire operation to the new company, 
and become a holding company or trust, ceasing to exist as an NGO? Will the NGO 
continue, enjoying apositive financial relationship with the bank, as it earns dividends, 
fees, or as shares increase in value? And if the NGO does continue, will the NGO 
microfinance operation absorb the costs of developing new business for the bank, start its 
own microfinance operation, or focus on a new mission? Each question has been 
answered in different ways in the course of NGO transformations worldwide (Fernando, 
2004); indeed the performance of Prodem, BancoSol's parent NGO, caught he eager 
attention of ACLEDAs management team.
1.2. Research methodology 
    The strategy of this research paper focuses on the discussion framework that analyzes 
the research structure and concepts of drivers of change. The reasons of transformation 
and benefits and lessons of transformation ate stepping stones to the drivers of change 
model and its assessment. No research project should be undertaken without a thorough 
research of second ata sources. These sources are valuable for this research for the 
reasons, including they solve some aspects of the research without having to engage in 
expensive primary research, the cost are substantially lower than the primary collection 
costs, obtaining secondary esearch data is quicker than conducting primary research, and 
obtaining secondary research data will help plan collection of primary data where the 
secondary sources are inadequate. 
    The major types of information that will be secured from these secondary sources 
include micro-credit program in Cambodia, National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) rules, 
specialized and commercial banking license, NGOs transformation a d reasons, and the 
plan, ownership structure, management, and exit of the studying organization. If the 
secondary data is not sufficient to answer the research questions, the online questionnaires 
will be distributed to several branch managers of ACLEDA Bank in Cambodia. Once the 
necessary data are collected, the data will be analyzed and summarized in a readable and
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easily interpretable form. The form of data presentation from these procedures would be 
presented in an easily interpreted format.
1.3. Discussion framework 
    This paper is presented into 5 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study objectives, 
background of study, research problem, research methodology, and discussion framework. 
ACLEDA bank overview ispresented in chapter 2. Chapter 3analyzes the transformation 
from an NGO to a commercial bank. Benefits and lesson of transformation are discussed 
in chapter 4. Chapter 5 is the conclusion ofthe study. 
    The drivers of change model is the core in this study discussion. I will employ the 
model developed by Anderson and Anderson (2001) to clarify what drives the needs for 
change of ACLEDA bank. After this model will have been discussed, the new enhanced 
driving forces of ACLEDAs change will be presented to identify whether or not it is 
suitable to apply in case of Cambodia or it is required to modification. This could not be 
done without viewing the related impacts, the external nd internal factors, reasons of 
transformation, a d the transformation to a commercial bank. 
    The model describes seven drivers, four that leaders are most familiar with and three 
that are relatively new to their leadership screens. It shows that the drivers move from 
what is external nd impersonal (environment, marketplace, business, and organizations) 
to what is internal and personal (culture and people). Figure 1 shows the drivers of 
change model, which categorizes to external nd internal drivers. The external drivers 
include environment (dynamics of larger context within which organizations and people 
operate, including social, business and economic, political, governmental, technological, 
demographic, legal, and natural environment); market place requirements for success 
(aggregate s t of customer requirements that determine what it takes for a business to 
succeed in its market place and meet its customers' needs which includes not only actual 
product or service need, but also requirements such as speed of delivery, customization 
capability, level of quality, need of innovation, level of customer service, and so forth); 
business imperatives (outline what the company must do strategically to be successful, 
given its customers' changing requirements, which can require systematic rethinking and 
change to the company's mission, strategy, goals, business model, products, services, 
pricing, or branding, to meet its customer requirements); and organizational imperatives 
specify what must change in the organization's structure, systems, processes, technology, 
resources, skill base, or staffing to implement and achieve its strategic business imperatives 
successfully.
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Figure 1: The Drivers of Change Model
Environment
Market place requirements for success 
     Business imperatives 
           Organizational imperatives 
                Cultural imperatives
Leader and employee behavior 
     Leader and employee mindset
Note: adapted from Anderson and Anderson (2001)
    In the internal drivers, cultural imperatives denote how the norms, or collective way 
of being, working, and relating in the company, must change to support and drive the 
organization's ew design, operations, and strategy. Leader and employee behavior refers 
that collective behavior creates and expresses anorganization's culture. Behavior speaks to 
more than just overt actions, which describes the style, tone, or character that permeates 
what people do. It speaks to how people's way of being must change to establish new 
culture. Leader and employee mindset encompasses the worldview, assumptions, beliefs, 
or mental models that cause people to behave and act as they do. Becoming aware that 
each of us has a mindset, and that it directly impacts our behavior, decisions, actions, and 
results, is often the critical first step in building a person's and an organizations capacity 
to transform (Anderson & Anderson, 2001). Almost always, leaders and employees must 
change their mindset o implement and function in the organization's new design and 
strategy successfully. 
    When the scope of change in the environment and marketplace is minimal, content 
change usually suffices. When change is required only to business and organizational 
imperatives or content and not to culture, behavior, or mindset or people, the type of 
change is developmental or transitional. However, when the magnitude of environmental 
or marketplace hange is large, then it triggers the need for radical content change, which 
drives the need for change in culture and people. This type of change, which includes all 
these drivers, is transformational. By definition, transformational change requires that 
leaders attend to content (external, impersonal) aswell as people (internal, personal).
2. ACLEDA Bank Overview 
   ACLEDA bank is a public limited company, formed under the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Law of the Kingdom of Cambodia. It is the first bank in Cambodia 
that assigned ratings by the top international credit rating agencies, Moody's Investors
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Service and Standard & Poor's. It was originally founded in January 1993 as a national 
Non-Governmental Organization (NCO) for micro and small enterprises' development 
and credit. ACLEDA Bank limited was licensed by the National Bank of Cambodia 
(NBC) as a specialized bank on October 07, 2000. On December 01, 2003, once again, 
it was licensed as a commercial bank to enable it to provide full banking services 
according to the needs of the customers and the market and it was renamed ACLEDA 
Bank Plc. 
    It is 51% owned by Cambodia interests, including its staff, with the remaining 49% 
taken up in equal parts by International Finance Corporation (IFC, a division of the 
World Bank), Deutsche Investitions-und Entwiddungsgesellschaft (DEG, a part of Kf' 
Germany), Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO), and Stichting Triodos 
Doen together with Triodos Custody B.V. as custodian ofTriodos Fair Share Fund (The 
Netherlands) (ACLEDA, 2008) (See Table 1). In accordance with license No.01/BIS 
issued by the NBC on December 01, 2003 and Approval No.052 issued on January 12, 
2004 by the Ministry of Commerce (NBC, 2002), the bank increased its total registered 
share capital from US$4 million to US$13 million, represented by13 million ordinary 
shares, each having an issue price of US$1 (2002: US$10) (ACLEDA, 2004). On 
November 30, 2006, ACLEDA bank has raised its issued and paid-up capital from 
US$13 million to US$30 million. It celebrated itsfifteenth anniversary and has raised its 
issuedd and paid-up capital from US$30 million to US$50 million on January 04, 2008 
(ACLEDA, 2008). According to the annual report on January 23, 2009, the capital of 
this bank has been increased from US$50 million to US$60 million and further increased 
on June 12, 2009 to US$68.15 million. Each share shall have I vote and shall participate 
equally in all dividends and other distributions of the bank; fractions of shares shall not 
be issued (Also see Table 1).
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Table 1: Shareholders as at June 12, 2009
1~Na15Sbr o~arap ~ip~~~. Shareholder Ownership (°o).-j
NGOACLEDA 21,808,000 21,808,000 32.00
ASA, Plc, 12,948,500 12,948,500 19.00
DEG 8,348,375 8,348,375 12.25
FMO 8,348,375 8,348,375 12.25
JFC 8,348,375 8,348,375 12.25
Triodos Doen 4,186,445 4,186.445 6.14
Triodos Fair Share Fund 4,161,930 4,161.930 6.11
Total 68,150,000 68,150,000 100.00%
Note: ASA is ACLEDA Staff Association (Visit http://www.acledabank.com.kh/EN/FF_shareholders.asp)
    With 227 offices and 6,887 staffs, ACLEDA Bank is active in all provinces and 
towns of Cambodia, and is one of the leading retail banks in the country at the end of 
June 2009. The offices are located in all provinces and towns of Headquarters, Phnom 
Penh, Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Chain, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong 
Speu, Kampong Thom, Kampot, Kep, Kandal, Koh Kong, Kratie, Modulkiri, Otdor 
Meanchey, Pailin, Preah Vihear, Prey Veng, Pursat, Rattanakiri, Siem Reap, Sihanouk, 
Stung Treng, Svay Rieng, and Takeo provinces (ACLEDA, 2008). Now, ACLEDA Bank is 
offering the credit, deposits, local and international funds transfers, trade finance, cash 
management, money exchange, and a lot of other banking services. 
   ACLEDA Banks vision is to be Cambodia's leading commercial bank providing 
superior financial services to all segments of the community. The mission is to provide 
micro, small and medium entrepreneurs with the wherewithal to manage their financial 
resources fficiently and by doing so to improve the quality of their lives. By achieving 
these goals we will ensure asustainable and growing benefit to our shareholders, our staff 
and the community at large. We will at all times observe the highest principles of ethical 
behavior, respect for society, the law and the environment. 
    In its organization structure, two major points, board of directors and president and 
CEO, have been picked up to examine the structure, activities, responsibility, and duties 
of each member. ACLEDA's annual report (2008) has pointed out that the directors are 
appointed by the shareholders for three year terms to act on their behalf. The articles 
provide that the board shall consist of nine directors, and that the board of directors 
(BODs) is responsible for determining the strategy of the bank and for conducting or 
supervising the conduct of its business and affairs; the powers of the BODs are to be 
exercised collectively and no individual director shall have any power to give directions to
62
the officers or employees of the bank, to sign any contracts, or to otherwise direct the 
operations of the bank unless pecifically empowered to do so by a resolution of the 
BODs; each director shall have unlimited access to the books and records of the bank 
during ordinary business hours. 
    The BODs shall elect one of its members by majority vote to serve as chairman who 
shall preside over meetings of the BODs as well as the annual general meeting. The BODs 
assumes responsibility for corporate governance and for promoting the success of the 
bank by directing and supervising itsbusiness operations and affairs. It appoints and may 
remove the president and CEO. It also ensures that the necessary human resources are in 
place, establishes with management the strategies and financial objectives to be 
implemented by the management, and monitors the performance of management both 
directly and through the board committees (ACLEDA, 2008). 
    The BODs is required to establish an audit committee, a credit committee, a 
compliance committee, and an asset and liabilities committee, and may establish such 
other committees as it deems necessary or desirable to carry on the business and 
operations of the bank. These board committees shall exist at the pleasure of the BODs 
and all members of such committees shall be approved by the board. The committees 
themselves will nor exercise any of the powers of the board, except insofar as the board 
may formally delegate such powers, but may make recommendations to the board for 
their collective action. 
    The president and CEO, Channy In, is appointed by the board of directors (BODs) 
with full responsibility and authority to manage the day-to-day affairs of the bank within 
the framework of the policies and strategic guidelines approved by the board. However, 
certain powers may be retained by the board and shall be formally recorded ina "Letter of 
Reserved Matters". The president and CEO appoints and chairs an executive committee 
comprising such of the senior management ashe deems appropriate. The terms of 
reference and proceedings of the executive committee shall be determined by the 
president and CEO at his discretion under the general headings of 
• Strategic direction: develop olicies, goals, strategies and targets for board approval 
• Performance: assemble and mobilize resources to implement agreed strategies and 
 performance targets 
• Risk: identify and evaluate risk in the bank's trategies and manage exposures 
• Compliance: ensure that the bank conforms to all corporate, legal and regulatory 
 requirements (ACLEDA, 2008),
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3. Transformation to the Commercial Bank
3.1. Reasons of transformation 
    There are many reasons for NGOs transformation. Most of these reasons allow the 
organization to continue its growth trajectory, growth that NGO status inhibits. The 
reason that topped ACLEDA's list for transformation was the limited donor capital 
available for expansion to meet the huge demand for credit. By the end of 1999, 
ACLEDA's outstanding portfolio had grown to USD 13,7 million, an increase of 37% 
from the previous year (ACLEDA, 2000). Given past rends and increasing demand, 
growth was expected tocontinue. As the business prospered, limited amounts of funding, 
coupled with concerns about reliability, pushed ACLEDA to seek independence from 
donors. Costs of maintaining separate reporting systems on target clients no longer 
matched the financial nature of the management i formation system (MIS). 
    There are three main reasons, sources of fund, savings approach, and legal 
framework, of ACLEDA bank transformation described in the following points 
accompanied bynot to transform reasons. The first reason is that transformation could 
allow access to commercial sources of funding, yet Cambodia's banking sector posed 
special problems that were not apparent in Latin America where the bulk of NGO 
transformations had occurred before that time. There were few commercial lenders in 
Cambodia in 1999 that would consider lending to national enterprises, let alone to an 
NGO (NBC, 2002). Despite liquidity in the system, the absence of a strong commercial 
banking sector limited the availability of local sources of commercial borrowing. The 
measures and products so useful to the Latin American microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
in the early stages of commercial entry such as guarantees were unavailable (Padhi, 2003). 
The Cambodian economy looked outward; each commercial bank that survived the 
capital rally of 2000 was funded largely from foreign or overseas capital. ACLEDA 
planned to seek loans from the Rural Development Bank (RDB), which by November 
1999 was reconstituted as a wholesale nder to the MFI sector, The RDB was permitted 
to lend up to 20% of its capital to one institution (Clark, 2006). A prudent policy would 
effectively limit the amount ACLEDA could borrow domestically. Unless the banking 
sector dramatically changed, or made way for new more stable and less innovative 
entrants, transformation would provide a legal standing for ACLEDA to increase 
borrowing from foreign rather than domestic sources offunds. 
    The second reason is ACLEDA planned to reexamine its approach to savings. If
properly designed, savings products would provide Cambodian micro and small 
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entrepreneurs with an important way to manage their finances and build assets. ACLEDA 
also looked to deposits as a source of funding for the organization. But savings products 
required extensive study. The sweep through the banking sector caused concern about he 
safety of deposits in the public's mind. As the NBC's ability to supervise them, only later 
would confidence in banks be restored. Legal status as an NGO prohibited savings other 
than compulsory savings tied to many group credit products. In 1999, the NBC 
estimated microfinance institutions held USD 1.6 million in forced savings from 134,350 
clients, or an average deposit of USD 12 (NBC, 2002). ACLEDAs own experience with 
savings figured in the determination to proceed cautiously. Based on demand from about 
half of their active borrowers, they experimented briefly with voluntary savings in 1997. 
The product was later discontinued as concern grew about the legality of accepting 
deposits without a license (Lucock, 1997). There was really no experience in Cambodia 
about whether people would save in financial institutions, or had confidence in the 
system to properly guard their money. While the theory on savings was well known from 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia's successful model, which ACLEDA staff studied throughout 
1997-1999, Cambodia's savers appeared more wary than their Indonesian counterparts. 
The total domestic savings rate in Cambodia was 4.4% of GDP in 1997, the lowest in 
Southeast Asia, compared with Indonesia's buoyant rate of 31% of GDP during the same 
period (ADB, 1999). 
    The third reason for ACLEDAs transformation was a legal one. The impending 
regulation within the NBC would require ACLEDA to apply for a license to continue to 
operate under the law. The government was considering some type of regulation that 
would eventually determine the way microfinance d veloped in Cambodia since 1995. 
ACLEDA felt it prudent o support he direction, although not many of the earlier 
proposals. There was no idealistic push for formalization; it was really a matter (a practical 
concern) of being ahead of the curve. 
    ACLEDA's expansion to 14 of Cambodia's 20 provinces, and its growing operating 
profit prevented falling under the radar as an insignificant banking activity. Continued 
justification as a non-profit organization seemed equally unreasonable to the staff. In 
1999, ACLEDA produced USD 1.3 million net profit from operations which enabled 
portfolio expansion toUSD 14.8 million just prior to transformation (ACLEDA, 2000). 
ACLEDA management felt the organization had outgrown its nonprofit status, and 
indeed it had. Finally, the uncertainty over the government's final decision about the 
ownership of accumulated donor capital encouraged ACLEDA to seek a legitimate 
ownership structure with clear claims on capital.
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    It is not easy to choose transformation. Many NGOs that engaged in the policy 
dialogue with the NBC agonized over certain policies. Their reasoning rested on financial 
considerations and differences of opinion about banking activities. First, they would be 
subjected to tax, license fees, and penalties for not following reporting schedules or 
prudential requirements. Second, they would have to give up donor funding. There was 
an understanding that most donors would shy away from funding privately owned 
companies, although the regulatory discussions did not prohibit grants to legally 
incorporated private companies. New shareholders would accept the responsibility to raise 
additional capital instead. Third, many NGOs thought hey should not be subjected to 
the NBC regulation. They disagreed that they were engaged in banking activities and 
advocated xemptions based on their social missions and poverty reduction goals. 
    The opponents of transformation did not list several major concerns about NGO 
transformation that are often cited by practitioners and scholars. They welcomed a more 
professional microfinance ommunity for the most part, but failed to anticipate he host 
of prudential requirements and rigors imposed by the banking law, perhaps rigors their 
management could not meet. Moreover, wide-scale NGO transformation would bring on 
a plethora of organizational disruptions, including the greatest of which would be staff 
attrition, management disaffection, a beleaguered leadership, and a perceived loss of 
control tied loosely to the concept of dilution of mission (Padhi, 2003; Rasmussen, 
2002). Even in mid-2002 some consultants questioned, "How it is possible that an MIT 
operates as a business can serve the poor and operate commercially?" They claimed that, 
"microcredit operators could end up marginalized bythe requirement that they register as 
MFIs." When they carefully considered the future of their organizations and the 
impending regulation such a questionable position must have shocked those who sat 
around the table in 1996, 1997, and 1998 (Rasmussen, 2002).
3.2. NGO's transformation 
    The transformation of NGO is somewhat a romantic label for the rather dry or 
legalistic creation of a new financial company by an NGO that runs a credit operation. A 
financial institution is created, licensed, regulated, and supervised under the banking laws 
of the country. The assets of the NGO are transferred in whole or in part in exchange for 
shares in the new company. What really transforms are the people, their horizons grow, 
their relationships expand, and their perceptions about running the business evolve as 
they leave the donors' protective cocoon and formally enter the world of commerce. 
    The drivers of change manifested at ACLEDA bank. How the forces in the external
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domains called forth and required the changes in the internal domains is noted; and how 
massive content changes could not have been implemented or sustained without 
significant ransformation to the organization's culture and the behavior and mindset of 
the leaders and employees. The environmental forces are developed from combination 
between environment and market place requirements for success, and refer that NGO 
transformation does not in itself spur growth, as ACLEDA found; organizational depth, 
management expertise, technical know-how, and profitability are preconditions for 
transformation. When a central bank grants a license conferring the legal status to operate 
as a formal banking institution, it recognizes the legitimacy that the customers have 
already bestowed on the organization. Business and Organizational imperatives are 
interchangeable and mean that the NGO no longer operates at the pleasure of its donors; 
it operates according to the rules established to protect the financial system. ACLEDA 
clarifies a further misconception about transformation. In cultural imperatives, 
transparency is not conveyed with a banking license; it is rooted in the culture of the 
organization, the values of the people who run it, and the systems they design to protect 
it. In leadership and employee behavior and mindset, the day the ACLEDA staff voted to 
transform, opting to depend on themselves in the future, and not on donor funding was a 
difficult decision. There was no guarantee it would work. Yet 98% of the staff voted to 
establish a commercial company and set up the ACLEDA Staff Association (ASA) (Clark, 
2006) which would become ACLEDA battles first private investor. Microfinance as an 
industry can never reach its full potential until it is able to move into the sphere of 
prudentially regulated institutions, where it will have to be prudentially supervised 
(Christen, Lyman, & Rosenberg, 2003). Yet the creation and operation of a regulated 
banking institution generate new demands, ones that must be met if the institution is to 
fulfill that potential. How the institution responds to those new challenges and 
opportunities depends on its history and prospects for the future.
3.3. The specialized and commercial bank 
    Interest of ACLEDA was in the specialized banking license. It was limited to 
specific banking activities permitted by the license, and it was valid for a three-year 
period. The specialized banking license differed substantially from a commercial banking 
license in its minimum capital and related reserve requirements (See Clark (2006)). 
ACLEDA viewed the specialized banking license as a stepping-stone to a commercial 
license, not as a permanent institutional category. And while those stepping-stones may 
have lined up and disappeared somewhere in the future, ACLEDA determined totake
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them one at a time. During 1998-1999, ACLEDA focused on developing a plan to meet 
the NBC's criteria to qualify for the specialized bank license. The most important areas 
were to strengthen the capital base, diversify the ownership structure, and reinforce 
management, which played organizational imperatives. 
    ACLEDA Bank Ltd would have preferred to take more time undergoing its 
transformation to become ACLEDA Bank Plc (a licensed commercial bank) if it were not 
for the more precipitous rulings of the NBC, in regards with environmental forces. Yet 
the greatest challenges surrounded ACLEDAs first entrance into the formal financial 
system. A similar pattern has expressed that before transformation, ACLEDA was a 
growing and complex organization, an ant hive of activity, shoring up the architecture, 
developing the human infrastructure. Rapid growth during the three years prior to 
transformation positioned ACLEDA as a likely candidate for transformation i to a 
licensed financial intermediary. 
    At the time of transformation, ACLEDA's balance sheet probably looked similar to 
many other NGOs just prior to taking commercial vows. 
• The operation had grown rapidly and substantially. The portfolio almost ripled uring 
  the three-year period prior to transformation; a nual increments never dipped below a 
  35% increase. 
• ACLEDA was profitable: retained earnings, excluding rants, amounted to USD 1.8 
  million for the eight-month period prior to transformation. 
• The operation had not only preserved donor capital, but had made up for accumulated 
  operating losses since 1993 through retained earnings. 
• ACLEDA (2000) reports that at the time of transformation accumulated donor equity 
  amounted to USD 11.2 million, or 58% of the asset base of USD 19.5 million. 
• The operation was under-leveraged with a debt/equity ratio of 0.44:1, compared with a 
  typical bank debt/equity ratio of 10:1. The Latin American MFIs had typical debt/ 
  equity ratios of 1:1 prior to transformation Qansson, 2003). 
• It mobilized no deposits - time, term or demand eposits. ACLEDA borrowed from 
  one 2nd tier lender, the Rural Development Bank, and two international donors, KfW 
 and Catholic Relief Services. 
    The transformation process was certainly costly (business imperatives), The 
transition plan itself had a price tag of USD 500,000, similar to other transformations i  
Latin America (Clark, 2006).The costs, shared by investors, place that figure much higher. 
But the real question is whether the benefits of a commercial transformation are worth 
the initial investment of donor money. Does the institution operate profitably without 
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continued subsidy? Does it meet he objectives ofadding value to society? Traditional 
performance ratios, such as return on equity, efficiency measures and those that decipher 
asset quality, assess chest benefits of commercialization. Thelink to the broader financial 
system shows through leverage of commercial sources of funds, such as deposits and 
commercial borrowing. The microfinance community has begun to examine ownership 
structures (organizational imperatives) more closely, searching for commercial investors 
with their own risk capital at stake and anticipating gains in improved governance. Most 
often these financial and ownership measures combine with measuring outreach to 
answer the big "so what" of commercial microfinance: does the institution offer a broader 
range of services to more customers, and does it continue or increase service to poor and 
low income clients?
3.3.1. Performance 
    ACLEDAs post-transformation experience shows increased asset growth and 
profitability as well as improvement in efficiency and risk management (See Table 2). The 
last piece of grant funding trailed into the organization in early 2000. In Transforming, 
ACT.EDA parlayed accumulated donor capital into a source of funding for the bank that 
carries commercial terms. The new loan agreements with the NGO required the bank to 
pay a cost of funds in excess of the deposit rate, the common measure used to determine 
the extent of subsidized funds in The institution. 
    Cambodia's high risk rating in international markets tends to increase the 
commercial bank lending rate (Lucock, 1997). These two factors pushed ACLEDAs more 
aggressive d posit mobilization much earlier than other transformed NGOs that initially 
relied on comparatively less expensive borrowing from commercial banks. Table 2 shows a
dramatic ncrease in assets, funded by the new shareholders, depositors and debt financed 
by the NGO and loans from other sources. Most of these assets are placed in an 
expanding loan portfolio. A transformed institution is expected to gain efficiencies of
scale, and indeed administrative costs to total assets have fallen, even as transformation 
required significant costs to meet new standards and build the future deposit business 
(Clark, 2006; Lucock, 1997). In commercial terms, the result of the transformation s an 
efficiently run, growing, profitable banking institution, one that complies with safety and 
soundness tandards of capital adequacy, liquidity, and solvency, cherished by central 
banks the world over.
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Table 2: ACLEDA Performance: Pre- and PostTransformation
ratSfp131+
5 *U
ation Tratsform>ation_~
Commercial Bank ironsiofmadoni, ;7atlzsd Bsnk ::
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total Assets (USD
million) 15.94 22.29 27.34 30.97 48.24 83.97
Loan Portfolio (USD
million) 13.71 16.66 20.98 27.54 4017 65.98
Portfolio to Total Assets 869/. 759/. 77% 89 84% 79%
DebVEquity 0.41 3.96 4.46 4.69 1.90 3.74
Deposits (USD million) 1.95 5.68 13.16 31.59
Deposit/Loans 9.29% 20.61% 32.44% 47.87%
Administrative Cost I
Total Average Assets j 2228 24.00% 20.92% 19. 92% 1929% 17.84%
PAR > 30 days 3.56% 4.62% 446% 1.71% 0.76% 0.39%
write-oft 4.96% 3.49% 5.84% 4.00% 1.16% 0.47%
Equity (USD million) 11.21 4.31 4.69 5.14 15.93 17.19
ROAE 14% 10% 11% 12% 19% 12.49%
Source: ACLEDA Audited Financial Statements, 1999- 2004. 
3.3.2. Customer 
    Who has benefited from transformation? ACLEDA banks national branch network 
brought he formal financial system to the majority of its customers for the first time in 
the history of Cambodia. Certainly the micro and small entrepreneurs who borrow to 
support heir enterprises are at the top of the benefits list (Clark, 2006). By the end of 
2004, ACLEDA Bank managed a gross loan portfolio f USD 65.98 million and guarded 
the safety of USD 31.59 million in voluntary deposits; 91,566 micro-loan clients 
borrowed amounts from USD 5 to 500. The average outstanding balance in the 
microcredit portfolio was USD 128, or on average 41% of GDP per capita (ACLEDA, 
2004). The bank's principal products (small and micro loans) are complemented byan 
array of financial services, including international and domestic transfers, payroll services, 
company overdrafts and a variety of deposit account options. Large firms and 
international institutions use payroll services and cash management services. Village 
Development Committees that receive and manage funds for social infrastructure now 
access bank accounts backed by transfer services. Factory workers end salaries home to 
their families in the village, who open bank accounts to accommodate hem. Small 
enterprises transfer payments to suppliers; and farmers dig up badly worn Cambodian 
Riel, travel to ACLEDA's branch and deposit them. 
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    Before ACLEDAs services became available, they did that something; such as they 
borrowed from informal lenders who offered interest rates in excess of 10% per month, 
they kept the funds for community infrastructure investments in the house of the 
treasurer of the development fund, and they moved millions of dollars across Cambodia 
in taxis and in the pockets of friends (ACLEDA, 2006). They kept their deposits in the 
backyard and in off-shore accounts; deposits that are attracted out of the ground or back 
into the country to finance Cambodia's micro and small entrepreneurs. 
3.4. Actual drivers play in ACLEDA 
    Figure 2 provides the points of actual drivers that play in ACLEDA bank. It is not 
surprising that all parts discussed above are related to the drivers of change model and its 
application. It is rather vague to broadly apply all driving forces, thus the development of 
this model is required. In ACLEDA case, the model could be simplified as the driving 
forces of change that consist of five forces, such as environmental forces, business 
imperatives, cultural imperatives, leader and employee behavior, and leader and employee 
mindset. For instance, from the drivers of change model, the environment and market 
place requirements for success forces could be summed as environmental force, because 
the market place force is considered as external environment factor. Since organizational 
imperatives already exist in any business organizations, the business imperatives could be 
drawn as a sum of those forces, and so forth. 
    The evaluation of change and the required expansion of leadership awareness and 
attention on the drivers of change model are both predicted and described.
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Figure 2; the Driving Forces of ACLEDA's Change
- Changes in technology: preconditions for transformation were organizational
depth, management expertise, technological knowhow, and profitability,
Environmental
- Governmental regulation: central bank granted license conferring the legal
forces
status to operate as a formal banking institution; and
- Customers: have already bestowed on the organization .
- Demand for higher quality of service; and
- Demand for lower costs ,
- Become more competitive and customer focused; and
- Lower bottom-line operating costs and improve profitability
Business
-The NGO no longer operates at the pleasure of its donors , but operates
imperatives
according to the rules established to protect he financial system;
-Setup ACLEDA Staff Association (ASA); and
-Restructure company into strategic business units along product lines to
1 reflect the needs of the market place.
j - Shift from family culture to bottom-line orientation;
Cultural
imperatives
- Shift from being internally focused to being market and customer focused;
and
- Transparency rooted in the culture of the organization , the values of the
people who run it, and the systems they design to protect it.
- Focus on results, not just activities
- Share information and communicate openly;
-Take risks
Leader and - Become more entrepreneurial and innovative;
employee behavior - Act more quickly and decisively in new market environment;
- Become more collaborative and less autocratic; and
- Staffs trusted management that the transformation would make ACLEDA
stronger.
- Leaders: Shift from "the customer doesn't matter' to'the customer is primary'
; Shift focus from "study and document" to "act and learn"; Think like
entrepreneur; Shift from a "take it or leave it" attitude toward customers to
Leader and
employee mindset
become more image, brand, and service conscious; and Shift from command
and control style toward coaching and motivating.
- Employees: Shift from "job for life" to "earn my way" through my results and
contribution; Shift from 'family" atmosphere to "look after myself ; Shift from "do
as your supervisor tells you" to "be empowered to do the job as you see if'; and
Shift from avoiding failure to learning through prudent risk taking.
4. Benefits and Lessons of Transformation 
    Three independent appraisals were conducted toassess the potential of ACLEDA to 
transform into a licensed microfinance institution. The appraisals, each with their own 
focus and each more comprehensive than the last, compared ACLEDA's performance, 
structure and environment with other notable institutions of the time that had 
transformed or were contemplating transformation. The appraisals were positive that 
ACLEDA's performance ould eventually match the others; however doubts lingered in 
the background. Just as early skeptics questioned the relevance of Bank Rakyat Indonesia's
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experience to Bolivia, citing the sparsely populated country as a limiting factor, skeptics 
now cited the level of poverty and the devastated physical and human infrastructure as 
constraints on the growth of commercial microfinance in Cambodia. To many experts in 
the field, Cambodia seemed to lie somewhere between perdition and the end of the earth 
(See Table 3).
Table 3: Current Performance for Four Commercial Banks Transformed from NGOs 
                     (Dec 2003 & Dec 2004)
19691984
Year Project-NGO
Established 1992 1985
Year of Transformation 2000 1992 1999 1998
Country Cambodia Bolivia Kenya Peru
2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004
Offices 97 119 32 34 27 2A 29 33
Gross Portfolio
(USD million)
40.6 65.9A 91 2 108.6 21 267 114.1 128.4
Active Borrowers 98,905 122,173 42,831 51,996 45,379 55,441 120,830 114,809
Deposits (USD million) 13.2 31.59 73.2 82.6 15.5 20.4 69.2 90.7
Savers 35,054 57,091 n.a. 58,622 62,648 71.796 42,345 53,294
Assets (USD million) 48.2 83.97 114.3 138.2 28.6 34.6 139.2 162.7
Equity (USD million) 15.9 17.19 168 18.6 9.0 9.8 31.9 37.1
Portfolio/Total Assets 84% 79% 80% 79% 71% 77% 82% 79%
Deposits/Loans 32% 48% 80 % 76% 39% 76% 61% 71%
PAR >30 days 0.76% 0.39% 8.96% 5.15% 6.7% 7.5% 3.8% &7%
Write-off as a % of
average portfolio
1.16% 047% 2.16%. 2.64 0.13% 0.41% 3.28% 385%
ROAA 4.1% 3.05% 2.09%. 3.11% 2.3% 2.0% 5.9% 5.03%
ROAE 18.7% 12.49% 14.5% 22.2% 8.9% 5.6% 26.1% 21.9%
Notes: Performance data for all institutions a  of December 31, 2003 and 2004, based on audited financial 
statements. The calculation ofROAE does not include subordinated debt. 
Sources: ACLEDAS 2003 and 2004 audited financial statements. KREP2003 end 2004 audited financial 
statements and information provided by KREP. For Mibanco and BancoSol, information provided by Accion 
International (ACLEDA, 2004; Clark, 2006).
    Whether or not a commercial transition could occur without destroying the 
organization was open to conjecture. That risk provoked the imaginations of the 
architects of the transformation plan. Some idea of a mechanism for transformation 
evolved from the experience of the Latin American MFIs, but there was no one model for 
transformation. The mechanism of transferring an NGO's accumulated donor capital to a
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newly created private company differed from institution to institution and country to 
country. What was known from the BancoSol experience was that the process could be 
long, expensive, and tumultuous for the organization (Clark, 2006). The idea that a 
commercial company could better help the poor drew criticism from many quarters of 
the international development community (Chavan & Ramakumar, 2002). ACLEDA 
staff pondered their own fears of the unknown within the organization, the motives of 
international shareholders, the extent of government control, the essence of profit-making 
companies, and perhaps the harsher staff requirements and qualifications that a business 
would demand but an NGO might let slide.
4.1. Benefits, risks, and costs 
    The risks and the costs were just as easily catalogued if the benefits of such a plan 
were tangible. Risks emanated from the environment and within the institution. The 
questions seemed endless; they focused on sources of funds, the regulatory framework, 
internal systems, taff capacity, and the objectives of the new owners: 
• Would commercial sources of domestic borrowing be available? Why would a foreign 
  bank lend to a fledgling institution in a country with Cambodia's high risk rating in 
  international markets? Would the amount of commercial funding really ever exceed 
 donor funding available? 
• What would the legal and regulatory framework look like, and how would microfinance 
 fit into it? 
• Could ACLEDA's newly designed systems withstand the rigors of supporting a 
  regulated institution? 
• Would staff embrace yet another system change, or would they rebel? Could they 
 upgrade their skills to match the growing sophistication of the organization? How 
  many would stay, and who would go? 
• Would shareholders' demands for increased value shift the organization away from 
  microfinance ustomers? 
    Each risk translated into costs the organization would have to bear. The plan was to 
maximize the benefits, minimize the risks, and manage the costs as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Benefits, Risks, and Costs
  _:''Snte(Ved Benefits .. ; ;'.. 
Access to commercial capital 
and deposits for expanded 
portfolio growth to serve more 
customers.
rating in international markets. i foreign lenders & subsequent
appraisals; costs associated
with mobilizing deposits.
Ability to offer a variety of new Newly established systems built Upgrade systems to produce
products important to for speed and accuracy, not information required for prudent
customers, such as savings, security, were integrated and I management of diverse
transfers and other banking well understood by staff. products and security. Upgrade
products that were unavailable Systems would need to be systems compliant with
in most of the country. changed for security, deposit regulations, and reporting
taking, and changing I requirements.
information requirements.
Clear legal status conveys rights The legal and regulatory I Subject to tax, license fees,
and responsibilities protected by framework for the entire banking I reserve requirements. Raise
the banking law system was still in draft form. J minimum capital rigor of
Microfinance legislation was low I reporting required dedicated
on the list. Prior experience with staff. Training staff &
banking authorities showed a management to meet
preference for a high level of 1 requirements under the banking
government control, law. Costs of supervision.
Clear ownership structure & Shareholders may be less Organizational upheaval,
governance system enhances forgiving of organizational resulting in staff turnover, high
institutional stability & imperfections and more costs of training & replacement,
accountability. demanding of organizational loss of morale.
growth.
Independence of donors Staff capacity: can a group of Upgrade staff skills, conduct
removes uncertainty & teachers become bankers? feasibility studies, market
restrictions; increases long-term 'Mission drift": will a drive for research, product pricing &
institutional stability & business 
decision-making.
profitability pressure larger loan 
sizes and targeting more 
affluent, less risky clients?
costing, investor liaison, legal 
advice, management time 
devoted to institutional 
investment appraisals.
Plan: Maximize Benefits Plan: Minimize Risks Plan: Manage Costs
Source: adapted from Clark (2006),
4.2. Lesson from BancoSol 
   ACLEDAs attention from their BancoSol expedition was gained from three specific 
issues. Each would have a lasting impact on ACLEDA's thinking about the basic structure 
of what was to become ACLEDA bank, Employee ownership, competition, and donor 
capital's preservation for its originally intended purposes figured prominently in the 
development of ACLEDA's own transformation model,
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4.2.1. Employees ownership 
    ACLEDA viewed the BancoSol transformation curious in its lack of provision for 
employee ownership. ACLEDA was a staff-owned organization, not in the traditional 
sense that profit accrued to staff, but in the real sense that ownership of the national 
development process had been successful. It was imperative for ACLEDA that staff (its 
greatest asset) should have a stake in the bank. Preliminarily, the BancoSol transformation 
team sought access to capital for the growing organization. They maybe thought staff 
would not be in a position to match capital contributions in the timeframe investors 
could marshal the capital for a larger and more stably funded organization. There were 
doubts about profitability. The idea that staff would risk their own capital in such a fragile 
venture with no proven income stream as a regulated institution may have led the 
architects of BancoSol's plan to demur the issue of employee ownership of risk capital to 
other more pressing risks of the time (Lucock, 1997). 
    ACLEDA management listened to Pancho Otero and the BancoSol and Prodem 
staff. Coming with a predisposition for employee ownership, they heard the stories of 
culture clash and plummeting morale as the bank no longer seemed to value the 
contributions of its NGO employees, and replaced them with more experienced banking 
professionals. Clark (2006) denotes that ACLEDA's management had no illusions about 
the power of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) to stem staff attrition, they did 
recognize the importance of the plan to employees. By inviting employees to participate 
as owners, the bank was making an important statement about how it valued them. The 
ESOP could ease the transition, creating support for the idea of a new company In the 
long term ACLEDA thought an ESOP could enhance employee productivity, as well as 
provide a means to share in the productive capital of the organization. It is that as NGO 
employees, ACLEDA focused on the problems and later on how to make the business 
grow. 
   While ACLEDA's top managements visited Bolivia, BancoSol was a profitable 
institution. In fact, BancoSol was heralded as one of the top performers in Bolivias 
banking sector, and was gaining world-wide recognition as proof that a commercial bank 
dedicated to the microenterprise market could be profitable (Campion & White, 1999). 
Hindsight of what was considered an unpredictable xperiment in the Andes in the early 
90s encouraged the young Cambodians to pursue an employee stock ownership plan for 
their own transformation. Channy In (the president and CEO) felt that creating a 
profitable enterprise without employee ownership would eventually lead to confusion and 
disappointment. At some point in the future the bank would make a profit. How would
76
the employees understand exclusive shareholding by foreign agencies? Why would the 
initial shareholders want to include others if the profit exceeded expectations? What if 
shares for a microfinance bank developed from the sorry state of a thin secondary market 
into a more robust one? Why would they want to include staff even if the initial 
shareholders developed a well-executed xit strategy? Atsome distant point in the future, 
the exercise of creating a means for employees to participate in the growth of the 
institution might be viewed as more burdensome than the simple transaction of one 
investor selling its shares to another (Clark, 2006; Lucock, 1997). 
    For ACLEDA's leadership, it seemed advisable to include employees front the 
beginning, just as they were included in 1993 as owners of the national development 
process. To ignore their history would be a mistake. Yet ACLEDAs leaders were not the 
blind advocates for ESOPs that a comparison with shareholder structures of the Latin 
American transformation model would seem to indicate. At this point in time, 
ACLEDA's experiment with branch manager governance was beginning to go terribly 
wrong as the interests of some branch managers came directly into conflict with the 
interests ofthe organization (Clark, 2006). 
    Four important lessons from this period guided ACLEDA's thinking about an 
ESOP First, ACLEDA's management thought ESOPs could he profitable for employees 
and healthy for the organization, but it was critical to balance the degree of ownership 
with concerns about conflict of interest. Second, it needed to prevent awidely dispersed 
ownership structure that might lead to an unstable capital base. Third, it was important 
that the shares hould truly be owned by the employees, not subsidized from additional 
donor capital or transferred to individuals from the NGO as compensation for sweat 
equity. Otherwise, the management thought, how would the bank really operate on a 
commercial basis? And how would the new owners of the bank treat the ESOP as an 
investor with equal status if assets were simply transferred to employees and management? 
Lastly, they determined not to separate management from the rank and file, who 
contributed equally to how the organization evolved. The ESOP would be designed to 
treat all employees fairly. These were some of the questions about employee ownership 
that the transformation plan later addressed. What became clear in the early discussions 
was that board-based mployee ownership was not only a desirable outcome, but also a 
non-negotiable position for the future of ACLEDA Bank. 
4.2.2. Competition 
    Consider the anatomy of an NGO transformation. This shows two distinct 
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organizational entities, the non-profit organization and the newly established commercial 
company. 1he first is already engaged in the business, and the other is about to start. The 
two organizations are tied to one another by an organizational history and a future 
financial relationship powered by the transfer of assets. 
    At the point of transformation in 1992, BancoSol bought the most mature and 
profitable branches from its parent NGO, Prodem. Initially the transformation plan 
relied on the NGO microcredit operation to feed new branches to the bank. Prodem 
absorbed the high branch start-up costs, nurtured the branches to the point of 
profitability and in the process, financed its own expansion with the sale of mature 
branches to BancoSol. The BancoSol plan proceeded to acquire a total of eight branches 
and a portfolio of USD 8.3 million from 1992 through 1994 (Clark, 2006). Meanwhile, 
Prodem's initial largess of unprofitable, mostly rural branches quickly developed into a 
bounty of new branches that operated efficiently and profitably. In early 1998 when 
ACLEDA management visited Bolivia, Prodem was applying for a license as a regulated 
financial institution. It was already a profitable organization with a client base that 
snatched BancoSol's own (Clark, 2006). From ACLEDA's perspective, Prodem would 
soon become BancoSol's biggest competitor. 
    The value of competition in microfinance is rarely underestimated as a factor that 
brings down prices and improves the quality of the products on offer in the market. In 
fact, the driving rationale for BancoSol's commercial transition was to create a thriving 
competitive microfinance industry in Bolivia. The founders of BancoSol, its board and 
donor agency supporters, viewed fostering competition in the market for microfinance as 
a marker of a successful experiment (Padhi, 2003). ACLEDA's view of fostering 
competition in the Cambodian market was somewhat less ambitious; for competition to 
emerge, first there had to be strong organizations surviving on a commercial basis. 
Eventually they would compete on a level playing field. From the market perspective, 
Cambodia did not seem ripe for new actors, but for strong ones. 
    Eventually, the demanding work of establishing one bank won out, not of managing 
two organizations, one that they might be unwittingly boosting as their own competition. 
ACLEDA's aspirations for a national network and the rising performance of its own rural 
branches prompted the decision to sell all of the NGO assets to the bank. If the NGO 
were to continue at all, it would continue in a way that was beneficial to the bank. The 
next challenge was to ensure how the NGO would support the bank without pouring 
subsidies into the newly created commercial venture.
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4.2.3. Donor capital's preservation 
    The final lesson from the Andes evidenced the future of the NGO. Having 
discarded the option of maintaining the NGO to feed profitable branches to the bank, 
ACLEDA decided the NGO would function as a trust and become an investor and a 
lender to the bank. New articles of association were drafted to cage the NGO to the 
exclusive purpose of supporting the bank as a shareholder and lender. The NGO would 
discontinue any other operations. As the influential shareholder, the NGO's powers 
would be limited to a financial relationship with the bank. 
    The plan had several advantages. First, it allowed ACLEDA to preserve accumulated 
donor capital for its originally intended purpose, lending to micro borrowers and small 
enterprises. Second, it offered a stable source of commercial borrowing for the bank. In a 
country with a weak banking sector, this idea had extensive appeal. Third, the option had 
the added advantage of streamlining operations. They did not have to worry about 
running two operations; they could focus all of their resources on the growth of one. 
Fourth, as a trust established to optimize long-term shareholder value of ACLEDA Bank, 
the NGO operations did not conflict with the interests of the bank. It would not be 
possible for the NGO, the influential shareholder of the bank, to succumb to political 
pressure for pressing requests. Finally, the plan attempted to address the issue of perpetual 
subsidy of the new commercial investors. The NGO established a commercial rate of 
lending to the bank. The NGO earnings would be re-lent to the bank at the same 
commercial rate, fostering the virtuous spiral of commercial feeding of expanded 
outreach. The variant in Cambodia was that the architects of ACLEDA's transformation 
plan hoped this spiral would happen within the same institution. 
    Experiments often define the unknown. When they work well they do not blow up 
the laboratory. When they succeed, they contribute to a lasting body of knowledge; they 
prove a theory and shape more daring attempts that otherwise surrender to the perils of 
"l
earning by doing". The pioneers map out uncharted territory for others who are freed, 
with that knowledge, to follow a different path. ACLEDA took ideas from everywhere 
and applied its own. ACLEDA learned from BancoSol how it could preserve accumulated 
donor capital for its originally intended purposes; it learned the importance of 
incorporating an employee ownership plan and not to underestimate the competition. 
ACLEDA learned from BRI about systems, products, and internal operations. It studied 
the microloan and the way BRI created district branches and posts in rural areas. The 
bank sent credit officers, tellers, audit staff, accountants, and IT staff in groups. ACLEDA 
learned to weigh carefully the costs and benefits of every idea. That bank learned never to 
                         79
do anything that is not profitable.
5. Conclusion 
    This paper presents he findings of a comprehensive study of the transformation f 
ACLEDA Bank in Cambodia during 1993-2008. The study questions have been 
answered on the transformation to the commercial bank and benefits and lesson of this 
transformation. From the drivers of change model, the modification has been simplified 
regarding the driving forces of ACLEDAs change. The lesson from BancoSol was 
discussed to develop ACLEDAs transformation plan. 
    From a national NGO for micro and small enterprises' development and credit, 
ACLEDA bank was transformed to a specialized bank in 2000 and to a commercial bank 
in 2003 to provide full banking services according to the needs of the customers and 
market. Three reasons of transformation that allow the organization togrow are sources of
fund, savings approach, and legal framework. The reason that topped ACLEDA's list for 
transformation was the limited donor capital available for expansion to meet he huge 
demand for credit. Given past trends and increasing demand, growth was expected to 
continue. As the business prospered, limited amounts of funding, coupled with concerns 
about reliability, pushed ACLEDA to seek independence from its donors. Of benefits, 
risks, and costs, the questions seemed endless focusing on sources of funds, the regulatory 
framework, internal systems, taff capacity, and the objectives of the new owners. Each 
risk translated into costs the organization would have to bear. The plan was to maximize 
the benefits, minimize the risks, and manage the costs. 
    The drivers of change model was developed into five simple forces applied to actual 
driving forces of ACLEDA's change. Through the lesson from BancoSol, ACLEDA's 
expedition was gained from three specific issues. Each would have a lasting impact on its 
thinking about he basic structure of what was to become ACLEDA bank plc. Employee 
ownership, competition, and donor capital's preservation for its originally intended 
purposes figured prominently in the development ofACLEDA's own transformation 
plan. Through the transformation, the capital of this bank has been increased from 
US$50 million to US$60 million in January 2009 and further increased to US$68.15 
million in June 2009. Final assessment is that successful transformation f ACLEDA may 
then contribute good experience for micro-credit NGOs in Cambodia.
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